A History of Government-imposed Censorship and Media Regulation

As early as the first republic of Brazil from 1889 to 1930, an era known as the República Velha (Old Republic), there were instances of total and overt suspension of freedom of the press. During this era, Democratic governance was disturbed by a period of authoritarian rule where “the army dominated affairs both at Rio de Janeiro [former capital] and in the states. Freedom of the press disappeared and elections were controlled by those in power (Munro p. 280).”

This era was immediately followed by a 15-year dictatorship under Getúlio Vargas, who lead a successful military coup d’état against the republic. During what is known as the Vargas Era, strict government control was exerted over business and private mail entering and leaving the country and newspapers were censored from publishing anything criticizing the Vargas government or any activities they were engaged in (Goldstein). This control was justified by the regime under the pretext of a “state-of-war” necessity as Brazil entered an alliance with the United States during World War II and engaged in military operations in Europe. It was also seen as a response to a perceived threat from a growing Communist movement centered in the city of Sao Paulo and spearheaded by the Stalinist Brazilian Communist Party.

After Vargas’ reign ended in 1945, Brazil returned to a civilian Populist Republic, which was marked by political turmoil and social upheaval. João Goulart, the 24^th president of Brazil, was the last president of this era. He was accused by his enemies of Communist tendencies when he tried to regulate agriculture through land redistribution of wealthy landowners to poor farmers. As a result of his policies, his already-weakened government was overthrown in 1964 by a U.S.-backed military coup, which effectively established a military dictatorship. In the four years following the coup, seven decrees were instituted on December 13, of which the fifth was the most extreme and oppressive. Known as Ato Institucional Número Cinco (Institutional Act Number Five) or AI-5, this decree closed congress and suspended many basic human rights under the pretext of national security. It further imposed “the harshest censorship yet known in Brazil” (Johnson and Stam p. 369) and lead to the forced exile or persecution of a number of intellectuals, artists, filmmakers, and political leaders. Of this group of exiles was the musical artist and political activist, Caetano Veloso. Many of his songs, often tinged with leftist commentary, were censored and banned as they were viewed as subversive material.

In 1985, Brazil was finally handed over to a democratically-elected civilian government. With this change came a new constitution restoring freedom of speech and press and other individual rights suspended during the dictatorship. Prior to 1985, for almost one hundred years, censorship of media was the modus operandi as these authoritarian governments sought to quell any public dissent under such pretexts as national security (Gaspari). Whereas the United States of America, from its’ inception, was founded on the fundamental right of free speech and press, the current 25-year-old Federal Republic of Brazil has had to confront the country’s history of authoritarianism and the lingering tendency of some contemporary elements of government to regress back to not just control of media content and the flow of information in society, but also a tendency toward absolute rule.

How Free?

The 2010 edition of Freedom in the World labels Brazil a free country or a country where open political competition, respect for civil liberties, civic life, and independent media exists (Freedom House). However, even as a free country, the 2010 Freedom of the Press report labeled the status of Brazil’s press freedom as partly-free and ranked the country 88 out of 196 (higher is less free) in the level of press freedom (Freedom House). The disparity between press freedom and political and civic freedoms can be attributed to several factors including corruption, undue pressure on the media, communication policies that are disempowering to journalists, and court-ordered censorship. In just the recent general elections, there were over two dozen documented cases of media censorship across the country as a result of biased court decisions, laws, police harassment, and other government actions meant to prohibit the circulation of information (Knight Center for Latin American Journalism).

Former WP president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, popularly referred to as Lula, was once quoted as saying, “I will defeat newspapers and magazines that behave as political parties (O Globo).” Throughout his administration, Lula had enjoyed high approval ratings and popularity among the poor for social welfare policies and programs created under his tenure. These stern reactions to media criticism of him and his administration had given some observers the impression that he felt he was above criticism (Denófrio) and have contributed to a vicious cycle of distrust between the media and government.

This distrust may have contributed to a polarization of opinions and thus a politicization of some media outlets. One journalist for Brazil’s Independent Media Center (Grilo) writes:

Lula was severely criticized again for complaining about the partial coverage the press gave about his government and elections. The press is able to expose daily its opinion and preach it to the readers. But Lula, is not he able to express his own opinion? Lula did not criticize the press freedom, not even the press as an institution, but the excessive partiality and lack of respect it has demonstrated. The press has been openly defending one candidate (Serra) while trying to blacken the other (Dilma). Is this not behaving as a political party?

Lula at the National Conference on Communications in Brasilia (Rodolfo Stuckert via Globo.com)

At Brazil’s first ever National Conference of Communications in December 2009, which was sponsored by his administration, Lula said in his opening speech that media commits “excesses,” publishes “lies,” fabricates news, and gets involved in campaigns that disseminate “slander and abuse.” However, he added, “the media in Brazil is free, it investigates what it wishes and what it does not wish, publishes and does not publish what it feels, but my commitment with a free press is sacred” (BrazzilMag). The conference, intended to propose and gather new ideas for telecommunication regulations, was also billed as a discussion on “how to improve freedom of expression,” (Article 19) and democratize media in Brazil. One objective of the conference was to discuss how to equally represent the diversity of voices and opinions in a mass media environment dominated by nine media powerhouses.

Yet, the over two dozen cases of blatant censorship across Brazil during the 2010 general elections appear to contradict the goals of the conference as well as Lula’s own words. We can refer to the case of journalist, Paulo Beringhs, as an example. He was the host of a news program on the Goiás state-funded TV Brasil Central channel. During the elections, he announced live that his station was ordered not to interview the candidate for governor, Marconi Perillo, by his opponent Iris Rezende, who was being supported by the departing governor of Goiás. As a result, Beringhs resigned citing dismay at the attempt to censor coverage. In another case, we see direct police disruption in the distribution of information:

The weekly newspaper Impacto Campo Grande had 850 copies confiscated by police on Sept. 12 for containing material criticizing Gov. André Puccinelli, who was up for re-election. The paper’s distributor, journalist Mário Pinto, was arrested by two police officers and taken to the police station, where he was held for seven hours, reported the website Midiamax. The journalist explained that the injunction prohibited the newspaper from mentioning the name of the governor, under penalty of a fine of roughly $29,000 per newspaper copy (Knight Center for Latin American Journalism).

In more extreme cases, especially when criminal activity is involved, journalists are faced with violence or threats of violence. For example, Francisco Gomes de Medeiros, a respected crime reporter in the state of Rio Grande de Norte, was shot to death outside his home on October 18 in an apparent targeted assassination. De Medeiros published reports on his blog about illegal activities such as vote rigging and drug trafficking. One suspect detained by police confessed that the killing was “revenge for his news reports exposing drug trafficking” (Inter American Press Association).

In cities surrounded by favelas (shanty towns), such as Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, press freedom and protection of human rights are being threatened by violence perpetrated by paramilitary groups called milicias (Amnesty International). Milicias are commonly made up of off-duty police officers, firefighters, and prison security guards who operate outside the law as vigilantes. They were born out a popular sentiment in the early part of the decade that the system of state policing is inherently inept and unable to deal with the drug gangs in the favelas. However, in recent years, the milicias have come to be known by the public for more than just fighting drug gangs, but as criminal organizations themselves.

According to former police special forces commander, Paulo Storani, they currently control about 100 of Rio de Janeiro’s 250 largest favelas, which makes them a far more dominant authoritative entity in the favelas than even the biggest drug gangs. Quoted in a recent story (De Oliveira) about milicias, state deputy governor of Rio, Marcelo Freixo, said “The milicias came in and offered their so-called protection to the residents in exchange for a ‘security tax,’ but then they took over gas distribution, the minibus service and cable TV.”

It is also well known that milicias are able to act with impunity because of their involvement with politics. They have propped up local politicians in the past and have been accused of intimidating residents in order to obtain favorable votes for particular candidates (Amnesty International). The true nature of milicias emerged to the public in 2008 when three staff members of the local daily newspaper, O Dia, were kidnapped and tortured for several hours while working undercover on an investigation on milicia activity in the Rio de Janeiro favela of Batan. Since that time, there have been no other known attempts by journalists to investigate the activities of the milicias.

Although violence against journalists is a relatively infrequent occurrence, when such violence does occur, they reinforce the notion that journalists are not free to publish anything potentially negative about those in power, even if it is true. Consequently the fear of repercussion is leading to self-censorship, where newspapers choose not to engage in investigative journalism. Much of mainstream and international media coverage of favelas focuses squarely on drug gangs, while the problem of milicias overtaking favelas and exploiting its’ residents, as well as the role of corrupt local officials, who have allowed this to happen, goes unaddressed.

A 1967 ‘Press Law’ carried over to the new constitution from the days of the military dictatorship imposed harsh criminal penalties for libel and slander, allowed for censorship of media outlets and writers, and to seize control of publications. The law prescribed up to three years in prison for journalists convicted of reporting on “facts considered subversive, distorted, or provocative by the government, as well as those whose reporting was considered offensive to public morals or found damaging to a plaintiff’s reputation or dignity.”  Before this poorly-written law was repealed in April 2009, newspapers that published criticism or suggested corruption of a politician or even information that put such a public figure up for scrutiny were at risk of being sued in court and heavily fined. The report notes a case where a prominent daily newspaper, O Estado de S. Paulo, was officially prohibited from publishing reports of a corruption scandal involving the family of the former president, Jose Sarney:

In July, a federal court in Brasilia, the capital, prohibited the prominent daily newspaper O Estado de S. Paulo from publishing reports on a corruption scandal over questionable real-estate operations involving the family of former president Jose Sarney, who is currently president of the Senate. In addition, the court ruled that the paper would be fined $87,000 for every story published on the case. The ban extended to other news outlets, which were forbidden from reproducing or quoting the newspaper’s stories. O Estado de S. Paulo was still under censorship at year’s end.

The problem is worse in small cities, where public officials have been accused of using the courts to intimidate newspapers and journalists. Despite the repeal of the Press Law, “journalists can still be jailed for up to two years for criminal defamation and civil defamation lawsuits sometimes impose stiff penalties,” according to the Freedom of the Press report (Freedom House).

Cases like the ones described speak to the larger question of freedom and democracy in Brazil: How free is a country when there is a conscious effort by public officials and criminal organizations to silence opposing views and opinions and prevent the reporting of corruption and crime to the public? How can a democracy be sustained when a free press is being undermined by the very people who are tasked with protecting this institution?

Toward Reform

The macroscopic and overt repression of freedom of expression and press that existed during the military dictatorship can be characterized today as subversive, covert, and almost exclusively motivated by politics, rather than a need to control for dissent against authority. Although restriction to freedom of the press is no longer legitimated by law, lawmakers have failed thus far to pass measures that control for misinterpretation and abuse of existing laws. As a result, there is very little to discourage and prevent abuse of political power when it comes to dealing with the media.

However, on the flip side, there has also been little to discourage and prevent media’s abuse of power as well. In October of this year, National Federation of Journalists (FENAJ) and the Federation of Radio Broadcasters jointly petitioned Brazil’s Supreme Court to rule that Brazil’s Congress is obligated to regulate articles in the Constitution dealing with communication, specifically articles concerning the right of reply, the prohibition of media monopolies, and the creation of quotas for regional content on radio and TV broadcasts (Magro). Jurist Fábio Konder Comparato, who filed the petition, argued that the media’s abuse of power “represents a danger for the preservation of democracy” reasoning that “public opinion is formed under the mental and emotional influence of the mass media’s transmissions.”

The National Conference on Communications was a jumping-off point to drafting such regulations, but was seen by the largest and most influential media groups as the federal government’s attempt to interfere with the press and its’ content. One proposal of much contention was the idea of a government regulatory committee or ‘social council’ that would give such a committee auditing power over media content (BrazzilMag). The idea for this committee was put forth by Lula as a solution to what he referred to as ‘violations’ in responsible reporting. He argued that it was needed to act as a checks-and-balances mechanism for the power of the press. Due to the perceived pro-government control sentiment of the conference, there was a noticeable absence of participation from the private sector, according to a story published in O Estado de S. Paulo. One media group that did not participate was the National Association of Editors and Magazines (ANER). The president of ANER, Roberto Muylaert, explained that, “The proposal to create a ‘social council’ to audit press content implies modifications to the Constitution which guarantees free initiative and freedom of expression” and that “social control sends shivers anywhere in the world because it is incompatible with freedom of expression and a free press.” (Bramatti)

It has also been recognized even by media insiders that responsible reporting has often given way to muckraking and pushing a political and social ideology, rather than reporting balanced and unbiased news. What was proposed to address these bad practices was the creation of a Journalism Ethics Council as a way to ensure the media abides by a set of standards for ethical practices similar to what exists in the U.S. This proposal was accepted and supported by FENAJ, who had taken on a more moderate, conciliatory stance with Lula’s administration. Although none of these proposals have yet been legislated, they signal a movement to reform communication policy.

This move toward reform by both government and certain interest groups can be seen as a broader attempt to reform Brazil’s media system. As outgoing president, Lula requested Social Communications minister, Franklin Martins, to draft a “regulatory framework” for the media system to be presented to president-elect Dilma Rousseff when she takes office January 2011. To that, Martins was quoted as saying, “If there’s no regulation, only the market governs, which means the law of the richest and most powerful” (Merco Press). This comment appeared to reference the nine corporate media oligarchies, which dominate the current system and have had much influence over popular opinion. Of these entities, the O Globo Group, owned by the Marinho family is the biggest and most influential. These media corporations have been accused of “serving the interests of conservative economic elites” rather than the population at large (Solomon). However, these same media corporations also own news outlets responsible for exposing corruption and mismanagement of government funds involving Worker’s Party members. Such reporting has lead to the resignation of some of Lula’s top aides and members of congress. Consequently, any move to regulate communication has been looked upon with suspicion and distrust by the media.

In her acceptance speech, President-elect Dilma Rousseff said that her administration would work to guarantee freedom of expression in Brazil, without going into detail as to how she would accomplish such a monumental task. Press freedom is inevitably intertwined with a healthy federal and provincial government, free of corruption and influence from special interest groups. Corruption and misplaced priorities in government and law enforcement threaten to throw off a growing movement in Brazil to democratize media and address the huge disparities in income distribution. However, a truly free press in a democratic society is not only assured in the written law, but by creating an environment where journalists can work without fear for their safety or of legal repercussions.